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Abstract 
The following essay examines the image of “Barbary piracy” created by two prominent 
political figures, Thomas Jefferson and William Eaton, and by the American public from 1784 to 
1805, and how those images shaped the policy of the American-Barbary War.  Eaton‟s 
Orientalist approach to describing piracy and the North African population limited his views of 
this region, thus reducing the American conflict to the annihilation of animalistic “brutes.”  
Jefferson‟s practical approach to describing piracy and the North African population focused on 
emancipating the region from the corrupting influence of greed, allowing him the necessary 
flexibility to solve the conflict by either by military force or with peace treaties, whichever was 
necessary.  I will show the impact that categorizing piracy as either the result of a depraved 
society or as a corrupting force had on both American perceptions of the North Africa people and 
on the outcome of the American-Barbary War.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Thomas Jefferson, William Eaton, piracy, corsairs, North Africa, Barbary, white 
slavery, white slaves, pirates, captivity narratives, Barbary War, Tripoli, Algiers, tribute, 
tributary payments, American Barbary War, Orientalism   
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In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the newly-established United States 
faced an unexpected enemy: “Barbary piracy,” or, more appropriately, North African corsairs, 
who had notoriously raided the Mediterranean Sea.
1
  Under the sponsorship and flags of North 
African states, these raiders had for centuries captured European ships, sold their cargos, and 
ransomed or enslaved their merchant crews.  No longer shielded by the British navy, American 
merchant ships found themselves newly vulnerable as they, too, worked the Mediterranean trade 
and sea lanes.     
With the American public awakening to the exotic new danger, American officials 
increasingly voiced frustration at the rising toll of “Barbary piracy.”  Over a period of twenty 
years, as American officials came to embrace a muscular new policy, and brought war to North 
Africa, they believed that the example set by the United States might finally end the practice of 
paying tribute to the corsairs and would lead European powers, as future President of the United 
States Thomas Jefferson would put it, “to emancipate themselves from that degrading yoke.”2 
The political and personal writings of the consul to Tunis, William Eaton, and minister to 
the France, Thomas Jefferson, from the years 1784 to 1805, chart the emergence of “Barbary 
piracy” for his readers.  For Eaton, this image closely aligned with the popular discourse- created 
through poems, plays, editorials and captivity narratives- about Mediterranean “pirates” and the 
rulers of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.  In this way, Eaton focused on the supposedly 
unchangeable characteristics of “race,” religion, and depraved sexuality of North African people.  
Jefferson, however, decried the “greed” specifically attributable to “pirates” and rulers.  As a 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper, I will be using the term “North African corsairs” instead of “Barbary pirate.”  The 
latter contains certain social and political connotations that I will explore further in a later part of this work.  The 
term “North African corsair” is a more accurate label for these Mediterranean sea raiders.   
2
 Thomas Jefferson to Judge Tyler in Naval Documents Related to the U.S. Wars with the Barbary Power, 
Vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 465. 
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result, his writings suggest that the repression of piracy itself would redeem North Africa‟s 
people and implicitly free them, like Europeans, from that “degrading yoke.”  Jefferson‟s more 
nuanced analysis offered a broader rationale for a war of liberation while allowing the United 
State greater latitude in dealing with its practical problems in the Mediterranean.   
In the following sections, I will begin by surveying the historiography of what is now 
known as the American-Barbary War.   I will briefly examine histories about the American 
conflict in North Africa, looking at general, military, and popular interpretations of the war that 
focus on the causes.  More broadly, this section will propose that we must examine how the 
modern, popular historiography, like the texts that come before it, is shaped by the language it 
uses to describe “piracy” on the “Barbary Coast.”    
Second, I will pursue this focus on discourse by examining the historical roots of the 
popular American image of North African “piracy.”  I will look at a variety of evidence written 
from 1780 to 1815, including captivity narratives, plays, and poems, to analyze the American 
portrait of the “Barbary pirate.”  While I will focus primarily on the common threads running 
through these texts, I will also note the ways in which they demonstrate how a demand for liberty 
for “white slaves” in North Africa problematically raises the issue of bondage of black African 
slaves in the United States. 
Third, this essay will examine closely the individual correspondence, both political and 
personal, of Thomas Jefferson and William Eaton from the years 1784 to 1805.  These two men 
played pivotal political and military roles during the United States‟ conflict with North Africa.  
Each man developed his own views and styles when describing the North African rulers, 
corsairs, and general population.  As this essay will demonstrate, Jefferson and Eaton‟s 
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influential writings are important lenses for viewing official American discourse about “piracy” 
in the first overseas conflict.  
Since 1651, the British Navigation Acts prevented American merchant vessels from 
conducting their own business in international ports, but once the United States won its 
independence in 1776, Americans were free to trade with any country they wished.    However, 
when the American colonies won their independence from England, English protection from the 
corsairs dissolved.  For some Americans, independence from England was bittersweet.  In 1784, 
Barbary pirates from Morocco captured and enslaved the crew from the Philadelphia ship Betsy, 
an act that shocked the new nation.  In 1785, Algiers followed Morocco‟s example and captured 
the ships and crews of two American vessels, the Maria and the Dauphin.  Both North African 
states demanded tribute money and presents to ransom the American captives; the American 
government had no choice but to pay ransoms because the new nation had no other resources to 
fight the corsairs and their rulers. Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Benjamin Franklin, 
appointed Ministers to France, became responsible for developing peace treaties between the 
United States and the North African states.  
In 1785, the United States was still operating under the Articles of Confederation in 
which the states acted in a “„firm league of friendship‟” instead of a cohesive governing body.3  
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government could not levy direct duties or 
raise a national navy, two powers necessary for fighting the corsairs.
4
  During the Constitutional 
Convention, the elected state representatives created a stronger federal system of government 
                                                 
3
 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815.  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 7.   
4
 Ibid, 15. 
  
- 4 - 
 
that allowed for such national powers as taxation, defense, and the conduct diplomacy.
5
  General 
George Washington was elected as the first American president in 1788 and, as North African 
tensions in the Mediterranean escalated, he presided over the first Congressional debate over the 
force needed to confront the corsairs.  Until Washington became president, the American 
government decided to pay the ransom and tribute money demanded by the Barbary nations 
because the United States did not have the naval power nor political clout to confront the corsairs 
and their rulers.   
During the Third Congress, in February 1794, Congress debated whether the United 
States should continue paying ransom money to the North African rulers or to send warships to 
fight the corsairs, and how many ships should the country to send if is sent ships at all.  
Congressman James Madison questioned if “in the public stores of the United States, a sufficient 
quantity of cedar and live oak for the building the proposed six vessels” existed to build the 
ships.  The Third Congress also debated whether or not it was wise to send warships to the 
Mediterranean because England could decide to attack these ships in route to North Africa.  
Some Congressmen expressed their fears of British retaliation, stating “there is infinitely more 
danger of a British war from the fitting out of ship” to fight the Barbary corsairs.  Congressmen 
Clark felt that even if the Royal Navy was not a threat to Americans, the ships the Congressional 
committee had recommended for construction “would be too small in point of number to be of 
any kind of importance amidst the numerous navies of Europe” and that “the distance from any 
friendly port, where in case of accidents, they might repair, was likewise very great.”6  A 
                                                 
5
 See Wood‟s chapter “Experiment in Republicanism” for a full account of the Constitutional Convention. 
6
 Annals of the Congress of the United States: Third Congress (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1849), 
433-436.   
While the Third Congress and President Washington did approve the construction of six frigates to send to 
the Mediterranean in 1794, if peace was declared with Algiers, then the entire construction project would be 
scrapped. This did happen, so the approved funds and ships would not really be used until 1801 when Pasha Yusuf 
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compromise was reached.  Congress and Washington passed the Naval Act of 1794, which 
provided the money and material necessary to build a navy to fight the corsairs.  The bill also 
contained a clause that allowed the President to halt construction if a peace treaty was developed 
with Algiers.  Construction on the navy began in 1794 but was suspended in 1796 after a peace 
was negotiated with Algiers.
7
  A tentative peace existed between the United States and the North 
African states until 1801 when Pasha Yusuf Karamanli declared war in March 1801. 
The growing scholarly literature devoted to the history of pirates has opened new realms 
of research, primarily through a focus on Atlantic and Caribbean piracy.
8
  In works such as 
Marcus Rediker‟s Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age, David Cordinly‟s 
Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among the Pirates, and the 
anthology Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader, the authors attempt to portray what life was like on a 
pirate ship.
9
  These authors focus on ship hierarchy and organization, gender roles at sea, 
homosexuality among the ranks of sailors, and the art of warfare and defense.  In general, the 
works argue that while life on board a pirate ship was a dangerous and hard, - unlike life on 
English or other European naval ships- pirates enjoyed a social position unbound by race, social 
class and sometimes gender. While these works do explore complex social, economic, and 
political themes in pirate culture, they focus on piracy in only one region of the world.  World 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Tripoli declared war against the United States and President Thomas Jefferson sent a squadron of war ships to the 
area.  See Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1905), Lambert, 
The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), and London, 
Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with Barbary Established the U.S. Navy and Built a Nation,(Hoboken, New 
Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2005) for more background on the naval ship building program. 
7
 Marshall Smelser, “The Passage of the Naval Act of 1794,” Military Affairs  22 (1958): 6-11. 
8
 Romanticized images of pirates in Hollywood film go back to as early as 1912 with the release of 
Treasure Island and continue to the present day with the fourth installment of the Pirates of the Caribbean saga 
Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides.  
9
 Marcus Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Piracy in the Golden Age, (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2004); David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life Among the Pirates, (New York: 
Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006); Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, ed. C.R. Pennell, (New York: New 
Yokr University Press, 2001). 
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historians have begun to take interests in piracy outside of Atlantic, and works such as John S. 
Burnett‟s Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas and Phillip De 
Souza‟s Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World illustrate the trend of pirate history to move beyond 
Atlantic Ocean to Indian and Pacific Oceans and forward in time to the present day.
10
   
In recent years, perhaps as a result of growing interest in parallels between modern 
terrorism and pirate practices, “Barbary piracy” has been attracting increasing scholarly 
attention.
11
  Not always clear in such literature, however, is the way that “Barbary” piracy of 
North Africa was fundamentally different from Atlantic piracy: the “Barbary pirates” were 
principally corsairs or state-sponsored privateers from Morocco and Ottoman-controlled Algeria, 
Tunis, and Tripoli.  These corsairs principally conducted their raids throughout the 
Mediterranean Sea, but occasionally ventured into the eastern Atlantic, threatening Portugal and 
worrying the United States that the corsairs would one day cross the ocean and threaten 
American shores.     
Generally, “pirates” are individuals who prey upon and rob others at sea without 
authority or permission from a government.  The qualification “without authority” is the most 
problematic when used to refer to North African corsairs, who were not lawless in the eyes of 
their own rulers.  The leaders of Morocco and the Ottoman principalities of Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli allowed their sea captains to attack foreign merchants whose countries did not have peace 
                                                 
10
 John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas, (New York: Plume, 
2002);  Phillip De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
Other world histories on piracy include Adam J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, 
Causes and Remedies, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007); Harold Cholmley, Sea Fights and 
Corsairs of the Indian Ocean: Being the Naval History of Mauritius from 1715 to 1810, (Port Louis, Mauritius: 
Government Printer, 1935); Henry A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World: An Essay in Mediterranean History 
(Baltimore The John Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
11
 Henry Adams and Stanley Lane-Poole may be the first historian to write about the American war in 
North Africa, but their work on this subject are included in their larger works History of the United States of 
America during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson, (New York: Viking Press, 1986) and The Story of The 
Barbary Corsairs, (London: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1894), respectively.   
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treaties with them; in return for being allowed to attack and capture foreign vessels, these raiders 
were to hand over a portion of the booty to their rulers.  This portion of goods, money, ships, and 
slaves provided the North African nations with substantial income and as Angus Konstom writes 
“privateering was a hugely profitable business, and their ports soon became bustling markets for 
the sale of slaves and plunder.”12  Thus, these North African sea raiders were not “pirates,” but 
privateers, or corsairs, who were an integral part of North African economic and political 
scenes.
13
  Konstam and Kola Folayan argue that the corsairs were so important to North African 
society that the rulers of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers were usually elected from the ranks of the 
corsairs.  In order to keep their authority secure, these rulers had to permit the continuation of 
corsair attacks on European and American vessels.
14
 Along the North African coast, rulers and 
privateers mutually benefited from each other‟s sources of power; one party could offer legal 
protection and sponsorship and the other could practice its trade and provide secure, defended 
bases and additional money for their governments and families.   
Such distinctions were often lost in the older historiography about North African piracy.  
Gardner W. Allen‟s 1905 Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs is one of the earliest general 
histories of the American conflict with North Africa.
15
 Allen‟s work gives the American 
                                                 
12
 Angus Konstom, Piracy: The Complete History, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 75. 
13
 Kola Folayan, The Reign of Yusuf Pasha Quaramanli, (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 1979), 1-
2. 
14
 Ibid, 1-2; Konstom, 76. 
15
 While the scholarly literature on Atlantic piracy covers various interpretations from the technical aspects 
of piratical warfare to homosexuality among the ranks of seamen, the scholarly literature on “Barbary” piracy is 
more limited.  Works focusing on European-North African relations examine the tension between the Christendom 
and the Dar al-Islam or the foundation to European conquest of North Africa in the mid-nineteenth centuries.  Works 
focusing on American-North African relations examine the build up to the 1801 war with Tripoli, the 1801 war with 
Tripoli, and the 1815 war with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.   
Sources for European relations with North Africa include Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend: War, Trade 
and Piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957);  Norman Daniel, Islam and the West: The 
Making of an Image, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1960);  Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary 
Captivity Narrative from Early Modern England, ed. Daniel J. Vitkus, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001);  Robert C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, 
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perspective of the conflict with North Africa and rarely attempts to characterize the North 
African corsairs, regents, or people as sophisticated actors.  Early in his book, he sets the tone for 
how his readers will view the North Africans: “with its advantages of situation and climate, 
Barbary should have been a civilized and progressive country.  Its Mohammedan population, 
however, consisting of Moors, Arabs, Berbers, Kabyles, and Turks, decided the character of the 
civilization.”16 Allen suggests that the “Mohammedan” population caused the region to be 
“uncivilized” and “primitive.”  Another general history of the American conflict in North Africa 
is Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod‟s 1945 The First American in North Africa: William 
Eaton’s Struggle for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805.  Like Allen‟s 
work, Wright and Macleod‟s book views the conflict through an American lens and characterizes 
the North African population as warmongering and fanatical.  The two authors applaud the 
tenacity with which the Berber culture resisted or adopted the cultures of “three thousand years” 
of conquerors, but note that with the arrival of Moors in North Africa after 1492, “the further 
incentive of Moorish vengeance and Mohammedan fanaticism” was added “to the natural desire 
of the [North African] corsairs for booty.”17  Like Allen, Write and Macleod characterize the 
“Barbary pirate” as inherently violent and greedy.   
Unlike the earlier general historians of the American conflict with North Africa, the 
military and diplomatic histories on this conflict are more neutral in their characterization of the 
North Africans.  Works by A.B.C. Whipple and Joshua London focus of the role of the early 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Italy, 1500-1800, (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2004);  Noel Mostert, The Line upon a Wind: The Great 
War at Sea, 1793-1815, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2008); Stanley Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, 
(Westport, Connecticut: Negro University Press, 1901). 
 
16
 Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 
1905), 2.   
17
 Louis B. Wright and Julia H. Macleod,  The First American in North Africa: William Eaton’s Struggle 
for a Vigorous Policy Against the Barbary Pirates, 1799-1805, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1945), 1-3 
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navy in the war and the development of American-North African relations until 1805.  Frederick 
C. Liner‟s focuses on the military history of the United States‟ trouble with North African 
corsairs by examining the second war with Algiers in 1815.
18
  While these authors depict North 
African rulers as less than magnanimous towards their American captives, the authors refrain 
from making generalized comments regarding the entire population‟s character like Allen, 
Wright and Macleod.
19
   
More recent popular treatments of the “Barbary pirates” often rely on stereotyped images 
that inhibit our understanding of such actors.  Amidst this growing popular literature, some 
works do stand out, however.  For example, Frank Lambert and Richard Zacks provide readers 
with a general history of the American conflict in North Africa and offer fewer stereotyped 
generalizations about the North African people.
20
  Unlike other authors, Lambert devotes an 
entire chapter to analyzing the use of the term “pirate” to describe North African corsairs.  
Lambert examines how these labels influence our understanding of these corsairs and their 
                                                 
18
 A.B.C. Whipple, To The Shores of Tripoli: The Birth of the U.S. Navy and Marines, (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991); Joshua London, Victory in Tripoli: How America’s War with The Barbary 
Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Established a Nation,  (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005); Frederick 
Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror: American’s 1815 War Against the Pirates of North Africa, (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2006). 
19
 For example, Leiner quotes the Dey of Algiers as welcoming a new group of American captives with the 
following: “„now I‟ve got you, you Christian dogs, you shall eat stones.‟  The next morning […] the captured men 
began their work as slaves.”  Leiner, 3-4. 
20
 Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World, (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2005) and Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret Mission of 
1805, (New York: Hyperion, 2005).  Zacks‟ work has been largely discredited for his many flaws and poor use of 
source material. In one review of the book, David Curtis Skaggs writes that “Pirate Coast is a lively written, error-
filled volume” in which Zacks cannot get the name of some of the key American officials correct (Zacks refers to 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering as “Thomas Pickering”).  Skaggs, “Review” The Journal of Military History 
70, (January 2006),  231.  While Lambert‟s book is also a popular history of this conflict, it is well researched and 
deserving of scholarly attention.  Lambert‟s interpretation of the conflict is based primarily on primary documents, 
including the Naval Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Barbary Powers, various periods of the 
Annals of Congress, contemporary newspapers, and the correspondence of several American politicians and 
diplomats.  Lambert‟s book offers a readable history of the American-North African conflict that introduces readers 
to the complicated military, diplomatic, and social dimensions of this period.  
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rulers, he admits that he continues to refer to the corsairs as “Barbary pirates” because the labels 
are so engrained in our language, histories and understanding of the conflict.
21
     
With their close focus on the American conflict in North Africa, many of these texts 
ignore the influence that the created image of the “Barbary pirate” had on both the American 
public and the American policy toward North Africa.  Throughout the twenty-year conflict, 
American writers produced numerous works of art and literature expressing their fears of the 
corsairs and for the Americans held in captivity in North Africa.  These images fall in the 
tradition that Edward Said has described as Orientalism, the “style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between „the Orient‟ and (most of the time) 
„the Occident.‟”22   The “Occident,” Western Europe and the United States, deliberately 
constructed what the “Orient” was through their own literature, artwork, language, politics, and 
history created about Africa and Asia.  Additionally, Said argues the descriptions that the West 
creates about the East usually tell us more about those cultures creating the image than the 
culture being created.
 23
  As I will show, William Eaton relied extensively on such Orientalist 
language, frequently characterizing the people of North Africa as “brutes,” “beasts,” and 
“depraved children.”  These descriptions, absent in Thomas Jefferson‟s writings, show us that 
Eaton viewed North Africans as an “other” who had to be completely destroyed in order to rid 
the region of depravity and restore integrity.  Jefferson‟s descriptions, however, show us that he 
viewed “piracy” as almost a disease that, when removed, the entire region would recover from its 
influence and would be able to join the Mediterranean trade network as equal participants.    
                                                 
21
 Lambert, 105-122. 
22
 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 2. 
23
 Ibid, 7, 12. 
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Orientalist imaging of the North African corsairs, regents, and people in the popular 
literature began much earlier than the American conflict with North Africa.  Indeed, like the 
Indian captivity narrative, the “Barbary” captivity narrative genre has a rich history that predates 
the American colonial experience.
24
  After the expulsion of the Moors from Spain at the end of 
the fifteenth century, Western European nations ships began trading and raiding along the North 
African coast.  Both sides, Europe and North Africa, traded or raided with each other for goods, 
specie, and technology.  As captured European sailors recorded and published their experiences 
in North Africa, this unique group provided Europe, and later the Americas, with some of the 
accounts of the political, social, and religious organization of the North African states.
25
  Nabil 
Matar writes that these accounts were more reliable than early English playwrights‟ descriptions 
of the “Moors” of North Africa.  The playwrights‟ descriptions used “English modes of 
fabrication” in the same way that “Renaissance painters depicted Jesus and the Apostles in 
contemporary Italian dress and manner […])”26  The earliest English descriptions of North 
Africans were not based on eye-witness accounts, but rather “imaginative brilliance […] without 
any historical or religious verisimilitude.”  Europe would not receive accurate accounts of North 
Africa until the sixteenth century when captives in Algiers and the other North African states 
began publishing their memoirs.  
Matar and others stress the importance of the information that these captivity narratives 
provided about North Africa for their home countries.  While most of the captivity narratives 
were not objective in their opinions of the mannerisms and customs of the North African people, 
                                                 
24
 Paul Baepler, “The Barbary Captivity Narrative in American Culture,”  Early American Literature 39 
(2004): 217. 
25
 Baepler, White Slaves, African Masters, 11-13; Nabil Matar, Introduction to Piracy, Slavery, and 
Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narrative from Early Modern England, ed. Daniel J. Vitkus, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001),  4.   
26
 Matar,  4. 
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the captives‟ stories provided the first reliable information on the “cities, distances [between 
certain locations], crops, military conflicts, religious practices, and social organization and 
behavior” for the region.27  Early captivity narrative author Robert Ellyett‟s “description of the 
political and social organization of Tunisia” provided the English government with an estimation 
of “the forces needed to conquer the Kingdom [and] to protect Christendom from the Turks 
[…]”28   Finally, these early English captivity narratives challenged preconceived notions that 
Europeans had about gender relations in North Africa.  Matar and Baepler analyze different 
captivity accounts that indicated, to the surprise of many European and American readers, that 
North African women had great autonomy and power in their homes and were not the victims of 
“dominating and controlling” men.29 
In addition to providing European governments with valuable information about North 
Africa, the Barbary captivity narratives became popular literature with European and American 
readers, and continued to be published into the nineteenth century.  As Paul Baepler argues, even 
fictional narratives “helped to shape history” so “we need to view [the fiction and non-fiction] 
narratives side by side.” 30   
G.A. Starr writes that the genre began to transform from the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century memoir-based form to a more adventure-tale based form from the 
seventeenth through the nineteenth century.
31
  Although the evolving captivity genre followed 
predictable patterns of “capture, enslavement, and escape,” Starr writes that the characters had a 
great diversity of background, which allowed the stories wide variation.  Within this framework 
                                                 
27
 Ibid, 4-5 
28
 Ibid, 23. 
29
 Baepler, White Slaves, African Masters, 33 and Piracy, Slavery and Redemption, 22-23. 
30
 Baepler, White Slaves, African Masters, 12. 
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of “capture, enslavement, and escape,” narrative authors explored social and historical themes of 
bondage, religious piety and possible conversion, sexual exploitation, liberty (the desire for 
freedom) and redemption (the acceptance back into civil society).  
“View her wide spread empire throng’d with slaves ”: the Conundrum of White Slavery 
Until American Independence, both the Indian and “Barbary” captivity narratives largely 
followed the same narrative themes of English captivity narratives.  The English model provided 
the necessary foundation for American captivity narratives after 1787 to explore in-depth the 
theme of liberty and the redemption of white slaves in North Africa.  Intentionally or 
unintentionally, this new focus on liberty for white slaves gave early abolitionists a new weapon 
in the fight for the eradication of the black African slave system in the United States.  Robert C. 
Davis writes that although both the North African coast and the United States had slavery, “one 
element stands out: slavery in the Americas differed at its inception from that of the Maghreb by 
being above all a matter of business.”  Davis continues that American slaves owners “may have 
experienced contempt, pity, or disgust for their human chattel, but they bought and sold them 
primarily for the work they could do and it made no more sense to despise these slaves than […] 
oxen or horses.” 32 
The continuing echoes of earlier narratives as well as English and American ideas and 
prejudices about the North African coast can be seen in Maria Martin‟s “History and Captivity 
and Sufferings of Mrs. Maria Martin, Who was Six Years a Slave in Algiers,” originally 
published in 1806.   This apparently fictional account illuminates the general fear and concern 
felt by the American people with regards to the United States‟ conflict with North Africa. For 
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example, Martin writes that upon her capture by the “Barbarian,” her husband‟s greatest concern 
was being separated “never perhaps to see each other again.”  Martin is subjected to the 
humiliation of the slave auction “where were gathered a great number of bidders […] of my own 
sex, which gave me fresh hopes for protection, but, alas! This fond hope was of but short 
duration for […] they seemed rather to exult my miseries!”33  Dramatic narratives like Martin‟s, 
both authentic and fictitious, provoked action, prompting some to organize ransom collections 
for captive Americans.  In addition, these narratives raised certain social issues such as class 
stratification, slavery, and potential sexual abuse among the captured.
34
      
Other American captivity narratives developed such themes, while helping to capture 
another tension within American society: the issue of slavery.  Two pieces of late eighteenth 
century American popular literature capture this tension: Susana Haswell Rowson‟s play Slaves 
of Algiers or, A Struggle for Freedom, published in 1794, and the anonymous poem “The 
American in Algiers, or the Patriot of Seventy-Six,” published in 1797.  Rowson‟s play 
highlights several common themes in the popular American discourse about the United States‟ 
problems in North Africa such as greed amongst the Arab and Jewish population, sexuality 
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depravity, and barbaric treatment of captives.
35
  The theme of slavery recurs throughout the 
piece.   As the American captives in the play put their escape plan into action, the Dey finds out 
and intercepts them before they can reach the safety of a boat heading for Europe.  Henry, one of 
the American men, faces the Dey and says: “hold off- we know we must die, and we are prepared 
to meet our fate, like men: impotent vain boaster, call us not slaves; - you are a slave indeed, to 
rude ungoverned passion, to pride, to avarice and lawless love; - exhaust your cruelty in finding 
torture for us” while they “set [their] souls at liberty.”36  Along similar lines, one character, 
Rebecca, reiterates the notion of fighting to the death for liberty and alludes to the fact that it is 
morally wrong to enslave people:  “by the Christian law, no man should be a slave; it is a word 
so abject, that, but to speak it dyes the cheek with crimson.  Let us assert our own prerogative, to 
be free ourselves, but let us not throw on another‟s next, the chains we scorn to wear.”37  These 
American captives in Barbary abhor slavery, will die in their pursuit of freedom, and fight to 
ensure that no other American would face such tortures, but what about the thousands of 
Africans in bondage in the United States?   
Most of the writings about slavery produced at this time are critiques about white slavery, 
but there were a few abolitionists who made the connection between slavery in North African 
and slavery in the United States; their writings reflect what they view as the hypocrisy of 
Americans fighting to end slavery in North Africa but maintaining slavery in the United States. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the poem “The American in Algiers, or the Patriot of Seventy-
                                                 
35
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Six,” overtly calls attention to the double-standard of slavery in the United States.  In the first 
section of the poem, the main character recounts his service in the army during the American 
Revolution.  After the war, the character gets married, starts a family, but cannot make ends meet 
so he must take to sea, where he is captured by North African corsairs.  He describes the attack, 
the subsequent work aboard the corsair ship, and then the character of the Algerian Dey: “the 
dey/A wretch austere! Whose haughty lookd, denote/A soul more savage than the forest brute.”38  
The character does make it back to the United States where he praises freedom and calls for the 
end of “Barb‟ry” threats: “Unsheath thy sword, let vengeance be thy theme.”39 
Although the first half of the poem contains many of the same themes as Rowson‟s play, 
the first canto is set up so that there is a sharp contrast to the second canto‟s lament of an African 
slave in the United States.  Within the first stanza of the second canto, the author has made it 
quite clear that there is something wrong with the American ideal of liberty for all men: “From 
that piratic coast where slavery reigns/And freedom‟s champions wear despotic chains;/ Turn to 
Columbia- cross the western waves,/And view her wide spread empire throng‟d with 
slaves;/Whose wrongs unmerited, shall blast with shame/ Her boasted rights, and prove them but 
a name.”40  The remainder of the poem recounts the experiences of an African slave on an 
American plantation.   The second speaker‟s experiences mirror the experiences of the veteran 
from the first canto and serves to draw the public‟s eye to the hypocrisy of the abhorrence of 
“white slavery.” 
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Some prominent politicians also contributed to the popular discourse of the “white 
slavery” hypocrisy inherent in Barbary pirate accounts.  In response to a South Carolina 
senator‟s defense of black slavery in the United States, Benjamin Franklin published a “letter” in 
the Federal Gazette in 1790.  Franklin‟s letter was a fictitious “reprinting” from a late-1600 
argument for better treatment of Christian slaves in North Africa.  Of Christian slavery in North 
Africa, “Sidi Mehemet Ibrahim” writes: “if we cease our Cruises against the Christians, how 
shall we be furnished with the Commodities their Countries produce […] If we forebear to make 
Slaves of their People, who in this hot Climate are to cultivate our Lands? Who are to perform 
the common Labours [sic] of our City and in our Families […]”41  To contemporary abolitionists 
and slave owners and to modern historians, these questions “Sidi Mehemet” posed are some of 
the same questions and arguments American slave owners used to justify the enslavement of 
black Africans.  Franklin‟s satirical letter continues to twist the Senator‟s argument for slavery in 
the United States so that Sidi Mehement‟s justification for the continued enslavement of 
Christians in North Africa is as sound as the Senator‟s.  
Orientalist American popular literature and discourse about the “Barbary pirate,” then, 
helps to illustrate the enduring nature of images and themes dating back to at least the sixteenth 
century.  Fictional “adventure” tales allowed the earlier narrative to evolve and remain popular.  
In addition, the “Barbary pirate” served as a vehicle for discussion of contemporary issues and 
themes.  Most prominent among these themes would be a discussion of American slavery.  
American officials seeking to sound the alarm regarding the threat of North African sea raiding 
thus had at their disposal a cache of imagery to rely upon, through the issue of slavery would 
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remain potentially fraught.  But, not all American officials saw slavery as important or necessary 
to highlight when discussing North African-American relations.   
 Thomas Jefferson and William Eaton do not discuss slavery in their writings about the 
United States problems in North Africa.  As mentioned previously, Jefferson himself was 
conflicted in his opinions of slavery and there is no evidence to suggest that Eaton had personal 
experience with slavery in the United States.  For both men, slavery was not the issue to solve, 
but rather the threat “piracy” posed to the United States.  Jefferson and Eaton were more 
concerned about ridding the United States of the burden of tribute payments to North Africa, 
securing the freedom for Americans held in bondage, and eradicating the corsairs from North 
Africa to free the people of the United States, Europe, and North Africa from the “degrading 
yoke” of piracy.  
The correspondence of Thomas Jefferson and William Eaton represents two of the 
dominant, competing, and, to a certain extent, intertwined American views of the North African 
corsairs.  Acts of piracy were not new to Americans and in many ways, Eaton and Jefferson‟s 
writings reflect both the Orientalizing influence of the American public discourse and the lasting 
influence the “Golden Age” of piracy had on the general American public. 42   More broadly, 
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both men believed that the North African practice of attacking American merchant vessels to 
steal the valuable cargo and enslave the vessels‟ crews, then demanding tribute and ransom 
payments to halt the behavior was highly insulting to American honor.  Ultimately, both argued 
that such affronts should be answered with naval force and not with “humiliating” tribute 
payments like those paid by their European counterparts.  In addition, neither man comments on 
the theme of slavery in both North Africa and the United States as popular authors have because 
Jefferson himself was a slave holder with conflicted feelings about the system and because there 
is no evidence that Eaton discussed the issue in any of his writings, nor that he had any direct 
experience with slavery in the United States. Beyond these broad areas of agreement, however, 
Eaton‟s and Jefferson‟s depictions of “Barbary piracy” differed greatly.  Eaton‟s correspondence 
contains derogatory descriptions of North African rulers, peoples, and society.  Jefferson‟s 
correspondence, emerging from the context of his successful early negotiations with Morocco, 
focuses more specifically on the “greed” of the remaining North African rulers and raiders, the 
negative effects of “piracy” upon the general population, and the desire for the United States to 
provide the example of how to properly deal with the corsairs. 
Thomas Jefferson: “These barbarians at sea be totally annihilated”  
Thomas Jefferson‟s experience with the Mediterranean tribute system came firsthand in 
1785, soon after he was named Minister Plenipotentiary to France.  As Minister, Jefferson 
worked in conjunction with Benjamin Franklin and John Adams to negotiate treaties with the 
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four North African states so as to curtail renewed pirate attacks against American vessels.  He 
clearly perceived a serious threat to the economic well-being of the young nation.  Two letters 
written in December of 1784 express Jefferson‟s fear that the American trade would be “totally 
ruined”43 if “immediate measures [were not] taken with the piratical estate… [to] preserve 
American trade in the Mediterranean.”44  His correspondence between the years thus 1784 and 
1801 testifies to his growing conviction of the need to lead Europeans—and, in a certain sense, 
North Africans—to “emancipate themselves from that degrading yoke” of piracy. 45 
Jefferson clearly saw piracy as an antiquated and corrupt practice.  In a revealing joint 
letter dated November 10, 1784, Jefferson, Adams, and Franklin detailed their opinions of 
piracy: “the practice of robbing merchants on the high seas, a remnant of the antient [sic] piracy, 
tho‟ it may be accidentally beneficial to particular persons, if far from being profitable to all 
engaged in it or to the nation that authorizes it.”  The letter goes on to describe those who engage 
in piracy as “losers” that rob their own nation of honest labor and corrupt their homeland by 
spending their ill-gotten gains “in riot, drunkenness, and debauchery.”  Jefferson and his co-
authors noted that pirates “lose their habits of industry” and are ruined once their career is over; 
while this might be a “just punishment for wantonly and unfeelingly [ruining] many innocent 
traders and their families,” it was clearly degrading for the North African states as well.46  
Piracy, the authors suggest, was the antithesis to freedom and industry so prized by the officials 
of the new republic.   
                                                 
43
 Henry Martin to Thomas Jefferson in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol 7 ed. Julian P. Boyd, 556. 
44
 American Commissioners to President of the Congress in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol 7, ed. 
Julian P. Boyd, 574.  The American Commissioner to France at this time were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and 
Benjamin Franklin. 
45
 Thomas Jefferson to Judge Tyler in Naval Documents Related to the U.S. Wars with the Barbary Power, 
Vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 465. 
46
 American Commissioners to DeThulemlier in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol 7, ed. Julian P. Boyd 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 492.   
  
- 21 - 
 
Jefferson secured an early victory in negotiation with Morocco.  Morocco had been the 
first country to recognize American independence from Great Britain and was eager to secure a 
treaty of friendship with the United States.  After the United States delayed its acceptance of 
Moroccan recognition, the Moroccan emperor had corsairs attack and capture the Betsy in 1784.  
Congress appointed John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as Ministers to France; these men were 
to meet with Benjamin Franklin in Paris to develop a peace treaty with Morocco and the other 
North African states.
47
  Jefferson appointed Thomas Barclay in October 1785 to negotiate with 
Morocco and by July 1787, both Morocco and the United States ratified a peace treaty.  The 
treaty protected American merchants from corsair attacks and included articles such as: “neither 
party shall take commissions from an enemy of the other,” “American citizens or good seized by 
a Moor shall be released,” and “commerce [between the two countries] shall be on the footing of 
the most favored nation.”48  Negotiation thus turned a former pirate haven into one of the United 
States‟ most enduring allies and gave Jefferson the necessary proof to believe that if “piracy” 
could be eradicated, an entire country could be redeemed.   
Beyond Morocco,  however, the degrading effect of piracy and the tribute system could 
be seen in the “greed” of other North African pirates and rulers alike, especially the Dey of 
Algiers, as they captures more and more American crews.  In a letter to John Jay in April of 
1785, Jefferson writes that the North African “rovers… calculate the worth of the prizes they 
may expect to take from us”, and “making some allowances for the expense and losses they will 
incur in these enterprises, they will adjust their demand” of tribute or ransom amounts.49  
Another letter to John Jay in August 1785 reflects Jefferson‟s frustration with the Algerian Dey‟s 
continued demands for increased tribute payments; Jefferson reported that the Spanish negotiated 
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a peace with Algiers as the cost of one million dollars and “a very considerate quantity of things 
in kind” as a tribute.  Jefferson noted that because this negotiation process was going so well for 
Algiers, there were “rumors [spreading] abroad that they are pointing their preparations at us.”50  
Agreeing with Jefferson, John Adams recognized that “with the people of Algiers […] treaties of 
peace are [typically] very unpopular… they say [peace treaties are] taking from them all the 
opportunities of making profits by prizes for the sake of inriching [sic] the Dey by presents.”51  
“Greed” thus passed from the pirates to the rulers, then to the people.  
In separate letters to John Jay and to the Treasury Commissioners in 1787, Jefferson 
wrote of the greedy practice of Algerian “pyrates”52 of demanding larger ransom amounts when 
it became known that the victim nation was attempting to rescue its citizens.  Jefferson wrote to 
the Treasury Commissioners that on the advice of the General of the Mathurins
53
 that it must not 
be known of the “public interest […] in the redemption of these [American] prisoners, as that 
would induce the Algerians to demand the most extravagant price.”54  For nearly two years, 
Jefferson was exasperated by the Algerian practice of increasing ransom demands for the 
American captives.  To Robert Montgomery in September of 1787, Jefferson wrote “I really 
deplore this situation of our prisoners at Algiers.  If they could have been redeemed at the prices 
formerly paid by the nations of Europe, I think it probable they would have been redeemed.”  
While during this period Jefferson primarily struggled to rescue Americans from Algiers, he 
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realized that the rescue of American citizens would not halt “the Pyratical states [from cruising] 
in quest of American vessels;” they would still demand ransom and tribute.55   
As his frustrations grew, Jefferson increasingly advocated for more forceful action.  To 
Francis Eppes in February 1785, Jefferson lamented the “the depredations of the piratical states 
on our commerce,” noting that they could “only be prevented by war or tribute.”56  To William 
Carmichael in August 1785, Jefferson recommended that the United States show how formidable 
it can be if pushed: “If we wish our commerce to be free and uninsulted [sic], we must let these 
nations see that we have energy at which present they disbelieve.  The low opinions they 
entertain of our powers cannot fail to involve us soon in a naval war.”57 And in May of 1786, 
Jefferson even suggested a land assault against North Africa to end corsair aggression: “Should 
[a war] become necessary, we have need of only one resolutions to place us on sure ground.  
That is to abandon that element where they are strong and we are nothing to decide the contest 
on terra firma where we have all to gain and can lose nothing.”58  Jefferson described the United 
States‟ potential enemies as “divided, and jealous of each other,” a “contemptibly weak […] foe” 
whose lack of strength on the open sea presents an opportunity to begin a show of naval force.
59
   
Jefferson‟s sense that military action was forthcoming clearly continued to grow in the 
ensuing years.  In a 1789 personal letter to John Jay, Jefferson wrote: “my favorite project is still 
to procure a concurrence of the powers at with them [the North African corsairs and rulers,] that 
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that concurrence continue till the strength of those barbarians at sea be totally annihilated […]60  
But as this observation suggests, even at this point Jefferson saw the main foe not as the general 
population, but as the corsairs themselves.  Unlike Eaton, Jefferson was able to separate in his 
mind the sins of the North African “pyrates” and regents from the innocent general population.  
Jefferson believed that the antiquated practice of piracy corrupted individuals, not that corrupt 
societies produce pirates.  In fact, Jefferson is specific when he suggests that North Africa sea 
raiders should be dealt with in a military fashion so as to save the rest of the population and 
salvage Americans in the area: to suppress “the present race of seamen [until] […] these nests of 
banditti might be reformed,” a small “but long continued” patrol in the Mediterranean should be 
launched.
61
  In March of 1801, Thomas Jefferson was elected President of the United States, and 
in this period called upon the new American navy to throw off the “degrading yoke” of tribute 
payments.
62
   
 
William Eaton: “The hero’s pride! Columbia’s honour’d chief”   
William Eaton, American Revolutionary War hero, was well-educated, hard working, 
opinionated and stubborn.  He was born in Woodstock, Connecticut on February 23, 1764 and 
spent most of his adolescence avoiding manual labor in favor of studying reading, writing, and 
mathematics.  As Eaton was twenty years younger than Jefferson, he had a different relationship 
to the creation and image of the United States; Jefferson spent his formative years during the 
height of the Enlightenment period whereas Eaton spent his formative years fighting in the 
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American Revolution and, as a result, each man developed his own view of how the United 
States should form its identity.  At sixteen, in 1780, Eaton joined the Continental Army and 
helped fight in the American Revolution.  He was discharged in 1783 due to ill health and 
enrolled in Dartmouth College in 1785.  Between his studies, he taught grade school, eventually 
opening his own school in 1790 while working as a clerk for the Vermont legislature.
63
  In 1792, 
Eaton received a captain‟s commission in the United States Army.  Henry Adams writesthat  
Eaton‟s “career in the service was varied by insubordination, disobedience to orders, charges, 
counter-charges, a court-marital, and a sentence of suspension not confirmed by the Secretary of 
War.”64   
                                                 
63
 Charles Prentiss, Introduction, The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton, ed. Charles Prentiss, 
(Brookfield:  E. Merriam & Co., 1813), 10-16.   For most of the this section on William Eaton, I will be relying on  
Prentiss‟s work. Although this book was published just after William Eaton‟s death, the majority of the book 
contains the diary and other writings of William Eaton with little commentary from the Prentiss.  Prentiss gives a 
brief biography of Eaton from his birth to his career just after the American Revolution, then the actual diary and 
other writings of Eaton continue the story of his life to when he returns to America from his campaign against 
Tripoli.  Because of the extensive use of Eaton‟s writings, I have chosen to consider this source as a primary one and 
will use it as such. 
Other sources include Meade Minnigerode, Lives and Times: Four Informal American Biographies,  (New 
York: The Kinckerbocker Press, 1925), 55-58;  Francis Rennell Rodd, General William Eaton: The Failure of an 
Idea,  (New York: Milton, Balch, and Company, 1932), 15.  There is a third biography of William Eaton: Samuel 
Edwards‟ Barbary General: The Life of William H. Eaton- The Amazing Account of a Flamboyant Hero who was 
Truly America’s “Lawrence of Arabia,” (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968).  I will not be using this 
biography in this paper as Edwards‟ information is generally wrong or exaggerated when compared to Minnigerode 
and Rodd.  Also, Edwards‟ work lacks citations, so there is no way to verify the conflicting material between the 
differing information.  For example, Edwards claims that during the mach to Derne from Alexandria, Eaton “rented 
hundreds of camels and purchased supplies worth the better part of $100, 000,” (4).  Rodd writes that Eaton only had 
a budget of $11,000, just over one-tenth of what Edwards claims, (221). Rodd‟s figures are also corroborated in 
Joshua London‟s Victory in Tripoli: How American’s War with the Barbary Pirates Established the US Navy and 
Built a Nation, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publications, 2005) and Frank Lambert‟s The Barbary Wars: American 
Independence in the Atlantic World, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005).  In addition to possible fabricating budget 
figures, Edwards also claims that Eaton spoke “at least four Arab dialects without an accent, and was so fluent that 
each might have been his native tongue,” (5).  Again, this claim is a complete contradiction to what other authors 
write.  Rodd and Minnigerode both remark that Eaton was fluent in French, the language primarily used while he 
was a diplomat in Tripoli, and that he was able to converse with his Arab troops while on his march to Derne, but in 
none of the other sources did it say that Eaton developed fluency in four Arabic dialects. 
64
 Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson, (The Library 
of America: New York, 1980), 593. 
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In 1797, Eaton was appointed American consul to Tunis by President John Adams to 
order to facilitate “treaties of friendship” between the United States and Tunis so that “peace 
may be continued [and] commerce be established” between the two countries.65  During his 
assignment in Tunis from 1799 to 1803, Eaton kept a detailed journal and copies of many of his 
letters written to his wife, friends, collogues, and various government officials.  These letters and 
entries reveal Eaton‟s disgust with the rulers of North African states and their corsair proxies, as 
well as his deep resistance to the tribute system.  Thematic analysis of Eaton‟s correspondence 
illustrates how Eaton employed an image on North African rulers as bestial and corrupted by 
sexual depravity, dismissing the society itself as poisoned by “fanatical” religion.  
Eaton‟s impressions of North African rulers evidently began early in his posting.  Within 
the first few days of Eaton‟s arrival in Algiers, he records his first impression of the Dey: upon 
entering “the private audience room” American Consuls O‟Brien, Cathcart, and Eaton “took off 
[their] shoes; and entering the cave […] were shown to a huge shaggy beast, sitting on his rump, 
upon a low bench, covered with a cushion of embroidered velvet, with his legs gathered up like a 
taylor [sic] or a beat.  On our approach to him, he reached out his fore paw as if to receive 
something to eat.  Our guide exclaimed, „Kiss the Dey‟s hand!‟”66  Eaton continues his image of 
animalistic Dey of Algiers for several more sentences and ends his entry with a lament: “Can any 
man believe that this elevated brute has seven kings of Europe, two republics, and a continent, 
                                                 
65
 John Adams to the Bey of Tunis, July 1797, The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton, 58.  
66
  William Eaton, diary entry, 22 February 1799, in The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton, 59-60.  
Perhaps inspired by Eaton‟s style and description of the Regencies of North Africa, Eaton biographer Meade 
Minnigerode begins her work with the following description: the “three merry monarchs” of North Africa were 
“three fat, bearded, rapacious ruffians clunking with jewels, whose xebecs, polacres, galliots and gallassees went 
darting in and out of their inhospitable harbors […] swooping down on hapless merchantmen, and dragging their 
Christian crews away to slavery and the .whiplashed rowers‟ benches.”  Minnigerode, 53.   This excerpt from 
Minnigerode‟s biography illustrates the power of Eaton‟s descriptions to influence his readers‟ perceptions of this 
group of rulers. 
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tributary to him […]” paying hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to trade in the 
Mediterranean.
67
   
His initial meeting with the Bey of Tunis elicited somewhat more mixed reactions, which 
Eaton revealed in a letter to his wife.  Like the Dey of Algiers, the Bey “was seated with his legs 
under him like a taylor [sic], on a sopha [sic] covered with a velvet canopy richly embroidered 
with gold, with a turban about his head, and a very rich kind of surplice flowing loosely about his 
shoulders.”68  Hints of decadence implicit in such a description are later spelled out by Eaton 
when he writes of the sexual “depravity” of the Bey of Tunis in a letter to Secretary of State 
Timothy Pickering.  While Eaton notes several of the Bey‟s ostensible qualities, Eaton luridly 
focuses on an aspect that would “would excite a blush in the countenance of the most depraved 
of nature’s children… however singularly unnatural, his favorite minister (the Sapatapa), a lusty 
Turk of about thirty-three, is the first object of his passion!”69 
Bestial, decadent rulers, in Eaton‟s correspondence, were corrupt and cruel as well.  For 
example, on February 1, 1895, Eaton recollects meeting an eleven year old boy “melancholy 
sunk on his countenance.”  When Eaton asked the boy what was the matter, the boy told him that 
“about four months ago the Kerchief cut off [his father‟s] head and took away all of [his father‟s] 
property.”  Now, the boy and his mother “are without bread.”  Moved to pity, Eaton “gave him 
all the money about me.  The child kissed my hand; and wept.”  Grateful that he does not have to 
                                                 
67
 Ibid, 60. 
68
  William Eaton to Mrs. Eaton, 6 April 1799, in The Life of the Late General William Eaton, 152-153.  In 
addition to describing the corruption and decadence of the Tunisian Bey, this letter also highlights Eaton‟s use of the 
same types of descriptions and wording in his correspondence to both his colleagues and his family.  The letter to his 
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Eaton‟s writings greatly contrasts with Jefferson‟s writing on the same subject matter. 
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  William Eaton to Thomas Pickering, 15 June 1799, Documents Relating to the U.S. Wars with the 
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face such difficult and potentially barbaric realities, Eaton closes his journal entry with “God I 
thank thee that my children are Americans!”70  
Indeed, Eaton‟s Orientalizing description of North African society breaks the people into 
three groups: “imperious Turks, beggarly Moors, and savage Arabs, distinguished from each 
other by their dress, or rather undress.”71  The “Turks,” to Eaton, consisted mostly of the corsairs 
and ruling classes of North Africa, the Moors made up the larger, poorer classes, and the “savage 
Arabs” made up the nomadic pastoralists who travelled the deserts and the hinterlands of North 
Africa.  Eaton‟s letter goes on to describe the clothing of the people, making snide remarks on 
the people‟s hygiene: “the ladies of Barbary […] suspend like curtains from the head to the 
ground, roll huge dirty folds of flannel or muslin blankets.”  As for the Jewish population: “the 
daughters of Abraham […] form a contrast to the Turkish women […] they appear dirty as brutes 
and as brazen as impudence.”72   
Eaton‟s stark and stereotyping view of Islam and Muslims can be seen when he describes 
these segments of society as being not only “abject slaves to the despotism of their government,” 
but also “humiliated by tyranny, the worst of all tyranny, the despotism of priestcraft.  They live 
in more solemn fear of the frowns of a bigot who has been dead and rotten above a thousand 
years, than of a living despot whose frown would cost them their lives.”73  Muslims and Jews 
alike are treated with broad brush when Eaton writes that the “Jehovah of the Jews would never 
rendered him [the Jew] respectable among that horde of Savages, if he had not thundered from 
                                                 
70
  William Eaton, 1 February 1805, Documents Relating to the U.S. Wars with the Barbary Power, V: 314. 
71
  William Eaton to Stephen Pynchon, 8 April 1799, in The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton, 157. 
72
  Ibid, 157-158. 
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  William Eaton, 10 August 1799, 123. 
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Mount Sinai.”74  Here, Eaton implies that the only reason the Jews are tolerated in a 
predominantly Muslim region is because the Jews‟ god had already demonstrated his power, 
suggesting that the North African rulers respect and fear only outward displays of force and 
power. 
Piracy, to Eaton, is thus the manifestation of this corrupt government and society.  To 
Eaton, “Barbary‟s” “Turks” are “consequently imperious, overbearing, and insolent” and have no 
regard for “human right and [are] unmoved by human misery.”  They are “pirates” who “subsist 
by plunder of some kind; either indirectly upon the natives of their country” or upon European 
nations and the United States.
75
  Eaton‟s descriptions of the “pirates” as a kind of fanatical horde, 
almost insect-like, can be seen when he describes their swarming technique to overpower their 
victim‟s vessel: the corsair‟s “mode of attack is uniformly boarding” and that their vessels are 
“always crowded with men from all points of [the] rigging; and from all quarters of the decks.”  
Once they prepare to board, the corsairs have “their sabers grasped between their teeth, and their 
loaded pistols in their belts,” so that their hands are free to scale “the gunnels or netting of their 
enemy.”  Like the wider society, Eaton suggests, the pirates are subject to religion‟s fanaticism: 
pirates are taught “by revelation that war with Christens will guarantee the salvation of their 
souls,” their “inducements to desperate fighting are very powerful.”76  In addition, Eaton remarks 
that the North African rulers view the corsairs as nothing more than expendable tools: “these 
pirates […] are suffered in existence for no other purpose but to be thus used.  Peace and war 
with them are articles of commerce; and they may be set on or bought off by the highest 
                                                 
74
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  William Eaton to George Hough, 15 September 1799, Documents Relating to the U.S. Wars with the 
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bidder.”77  In a September 2, 1800 letter, Eaton sums up the North African rulers‟ view of 
European and the United States:  “It is the maxim of the Barbary States, that „The Christians who 
would be on good terms with them must fight well or pay well” and these rulers use their 
effective tool of piracy to ensure that the Christians do one or the other.
 78
   
To Eaton, the American course was clear: the United States was obliged to declare war 
against the North African states to rescue American captives and avenge the insult of corsair 
attacks “if we fail at success you will do us the justice to believe us martyrs to a cause in which 
we feel the honor and interest of our country deeply involved.”  The United States must work to 
“release our prisoners without ransom, and peace without the disgraceful conditions of tribute.”79  
Eaton calls for naval action against North Africa that will provide an example to the 
“effeminate” nations of Europe and rid North Africa of its pirates and ruling “beasts.”  Early in 
his commission, Eaton wrote to William Smith, American Minister to Portugal, questioning the 
wisdom of the United States following the European example of paying tribute for safe passage 
in the Mediterranean, noting that “humility,” paying bribes and tributes, “invites insult” and  
the greater our concession the more accumulated will be the demands upon us.  Nothing 
can be more absurd than to expect by presents to satisfy the demands of these marauding 
and beggarly courts who have no sense of gratitude, no sentiments of honor, no respect 
for justice, no restraint from fear, and whose avarice is as insatiable as death.  
 
This letter continues to point out American folly for believing “the friendly mediation of Algiers 
to obtain peace with Tunis.”  Eaton complains “we have really been stupid” to engage Algiers in 
such matters, that this will only place money “in the hands of one highwayman to keep it out of 
the hands of his companion, and taking one horsejockey [sic] to guarantee the word and honor of 
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another.”  Eaton finally closes this long letter to Smith with a blunt suggestion as to what the 
United States should do in treating with the North African states: “America must shew [sic] a 
force in this sea.  National interest, honor, safety demand it.  The appearance of a few frigates 
would produce what the whole revenue of a country would not.  They would produce impression 
of terror and respect.  Without force, we are neither safe nor respectable here.”80 
Eaton‟s June 23, 1800 letter to Pickering continues this idea that the United States should 
not consent to being “tributaries” to North Africa.  He laments that the United States has lost its 
intolerance for such treatment, writing “nobody here [at the Tunisian court] acquainted with our 
concessions, could be persuaded that we are the same Americans who, twenty years ago, braved 
the resentment of Great Britain, if that fact were not recorded.” 81  To keep from following in the 
steps of those “effeminate Christian powers of the Mediterranean,”82 America “must either send a 
show of force to the Tunis [sic] or [become] a Slave!”83    
By the time of Eaton‟s July 1802 letter to two American merchants from Philadelphia, 
Thomas Jefferson had declared war against Tripoli.   In spite of the declaration, Eaton continued 
urging stronger shows of force by the American navy against the North African states.  Eaton 
used descriptions of the plight of captured Americans to help win support for his belief that only 
American naval attacks will save American captives.  Eaton writes: “our citizens [were] dragged 
to Slavery and goaded to a lingering death under the bastinado of merciless robbers.”  Here, 
Eaton‟s choice to use the word “bastinado” in describing the “merciless robbers” further 
characterizes the corsairs as depraved and cruel people; “bastinado” was a common form of 
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torture that subjected people to long and continued beatings on the soles of their feet. For Eaton 
to use this term, he further reinforced the idea that the corsairs are brutal, cruel, and sadistic to 
American captives.   
Eaton‟s account continued with a complaint of how the United States would be forced to 
pay ransom of their citizens: “what is still more humiliating, after all this, we shall be compelled 
to purchase peace on the terms of an unprincipled, overbearing Bashaw of a wretched dog-
kennel, without at all remedying the evil.”  Eaton predicted that the United States could not 
“yield to this, and look the world in the face without a blush.”   He continued in this fashion, 
warning “the moment we subscribe to the demands of Tripoli, we shall have Tunis and Algiers, 
in a more imperious tone, demanding more substantial proofs of the veritable friendship of the 
President of the United States.”  If that should happen, “let [America] blot the stars from her 
escutcheon and view with sack-cloth the sun of her former glory.”84 
“That these nests of banditti might be reformed”: War with Tripoli  
During their respective terms as Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul, Jefferson and Eaton 
spent their energies attempting to convince other lawmakers and political leaders of the best way 
to solve the United States‟ tributary problem with North Africa.  Until 1801, both men played 
advisory roles in the conflict, but upon Jefferson‟s election to the Presidency, he was suddenly in 
charge of the entire conflict in which he and Eaton would take active roles.  When Tripoli 
declared war on the United States in 1801, Jefferson finally had the required justification to use 
military force against the corsairs.  However, Jefferson‟s correspondence during the 1801 to 
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1805 war reflects a struggle with using all available force against North Africa while ensuring 
that the war did not bankrupt the American treasury.  
Throughout his first term, Jefferson‟s letters were more formal and direct than his letters 
as Minister.  As President, Jefferson had to be more flexible in how he handled national 
problems.  For example, in an August 1802, Jefferson asked Albert Gallatin, the Treasury 
Secretary, for his opinion as to the number of ships that should be sent to the Mediterranean 
since Morocco has declared war on the United States: “We expect the Boston to return shortly: 
there will then remain there the Chesapeake, Constellation, and the Adams, of which we had 
thought of recalling one, as two were deemed sufficient for Tripoli.  It is now a question whether 
we should not leave the three there, and whether we should send another?”85  Jefferson was 
interested in Gallatin‟s opinion of how the naval budget would impact the rest of American 
finances.     
Instead of campaigning for a fight against the corsairs, during this period, President 
Jefferson debated on how best to win the war and end the conflict in the Mediterranean.  In 
another letter to Gallatin, Jefferson appears to welcome a method of peace that is completely 
contradictory to all of his correspondence as Minister to France and as Secretary of State:  
Gallatin writes on March 21, 1803 that “peace [with Tripoli] might have been obtained for five 
thousand dollars,” but due to the delay of American representatives in complying with Tripoli‟s 
wishes “a peace cannot be attained but upon very extravagant terms.”86  In response, Jefferson 
writes: “I am in all cases for a liberal conduct towards other nations, believing that the practice of 
the same friendly feelings and generous dispositions which attach individuals in private lie attach 
                                                 
85
 Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 9 August 1802, in The Writings of Albert Gallatin, Vol. I, ed. Henry Adams, 
(New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd, 1960), 83-84.  
86
 Albert Gallatin to Jefferson, 21 March 1803, Ibid, 118. 
  
- 34 - 
 
societies on the large scale, which are composed of individuals.”87  This letter shows that 
Jefferson is willing to entertain the idea of buying peace with Tripoli, an idea that he openly 
scoffed at and argued against for nearly fifteen years previously.  This switch in tactics illustrates 
that as President, Jefferson had to consider the entire picture of the war in the Mediterranean.   
Jefferson was able to be this flexible because he did not view the people of North Africa 
as a corrupt group that needed extermination.  Instead, he saw piracy as the main culprit and,  as 
in the case of  Morocco in 1785, if Jefferson could weaken or eliminate the threat of the pirates, 
then Trioplitanian and the other North African peoples could be redeemed and emancipated from 
the “degrading yoke.”    
Eaton‟s Orientalist demonization of the people of North Africa served as his own 
downfall.  Because he viewed the North African rulers and people as animalistic “brutes” that 
turned to piracy to support their depraved lifestyles, Eaton argued the only way to rid the United 
States of the piratical threat was to attack the entire population.  Unlike Jefferson, Eaton 
remained inflexible to suggestions or new ways of thinking about the people of North Africa and 
how to best solve the American conflict in that region. 
Eaton‟s solution for ending the United States‟ problems in North Africa was to launch a 
land campaign against the capitol city of Tripoli in 1804.  Eaton thought that his land campaign 
could be one half of a two-part bombardment of Tripoli, that his land forces would complement a 
full naval assault on the city.  This strong military attack would take Pasha Yusuf, ruler of 
Tripoli, by surprise and force him to end the war against the United States.  If successful, the 
United States would then be able to negotiate a peace treaty completely on American terms and 
end all North African aggression against the United States.  After finally convincing President 
Jefferson that his land campaign could be effective, Eaton was given permission to lead ten 
                                                 
87
  Jefferson to Gallatin, 28 March 1803, Ibid, 119. 
  
- 35 - 
 
American Marines, thirty Greek mercenary solders, and around 300 Arab volunteers on a march 
from Cairo, Egypt to Derne, Tripoli.  Once in Derne, Eaton planned to engage the Tripolitanian 
army stationed there then march on to Tripoli.
88
  On April 26, 1805, after two days of battle with 
the Tripolitanian troops, Eaton sent a note to Governor Mustafa of Derne, demanding his 
surrender.  With characteristic brashness, Eaton wrote “give us passage through your city […] let 
no differences of religion induce us to shed the blood of harmless men who think little and know 
nothing.  If you are a man of liberal mind you will not balance the propositions I offer […] I 
shall see you to morrow [sic] in a way of your choice.”89  After another bloody battle, Eaton 
finally defeated the troops and prepared to continue his march on Tripoli.  However, Eaton was 
recalled by Commodore Roberts and was forced to retreat back to American naval ships; 
Jefferson had put a halt to Eaton‟s plan to march to Tripoli and engage the rest of the 
Trioplitanian army in favor of ending with war with a peace treaty.  Commodore Roberts arrived 
in Derne on June 11, 1805 with orders dated June 5, 1805 for Eaton to cease his fight and to 
evacuate Derne.   Unknown to Eaton, in June 1804, Jefferson ordered Colonel Tobias Lear to 
conduct peace negotiations with Pasha Yusuf Karamanli, giving Lear the full authority to 
terminate the war and forcing Eaton to abandon his plan of a coup.  In 1805, Lear worked out a 
treaty with Yusuf that named the United States the victor, required a small payment for the return 
of all American prisoners of war, and guaranteed the halt of Trioplitanian corsair attacks against 
American ships.
90
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Disgusted and disgraced, Eaton returned to the United States believing he had not 
completed his mission.  Treated as a political liability and shunned by politicians for his idea of 
an American-sponsored coup, Eaton was hailed a hero by the general public.
91
  John Greenleaf 
Whittier committed William Eaton‟s actions in Tripoli to verse in his 1850 poem called “Derne.”   
Orientalist imagery runs through this work as well: “The dusty Bornou caravan/ lies heaped in 
slumber, beast and man;/ The Shiek [sic] is dreaming in his tent/ His noisy Arab tongue 
o‟erspent;”  and “Like some bad dream, the Jew/ Creeps stealthily his quarter through,/ Or 
counts with fear his golden heaps,/ The City of the Corsair sleeps!”  Like Rowson‟s play, this 
poem highlights Whittier‟s opinion of not only the North African corsairs but North Africa‟s 
Jewish population as well.
 92
  The image of the greedy Jew and exotic Arab are themes repeated 
in several other popular works.  This poem and other literary works
93
 produced after the end of 
the 1801 war with Tripoli show that although William Eaton may have disgraced himself in the 
eyes of American politicians, to the American public and to Federalists, he was a hero of a war 
that embodied the ideals of liberty.  To the public, Eaton was remembered as:  “the hero‟s pride! 
Colombia‟s honour‟d chief; the learn‟d, the wise, and the eminently brave […] a man, whose 
mighty shoulder on daring acts is bent.”94 
Jefferson‟s and Eaton‟s different approaches to characterizing both piracy and the people 
of North Africa dictated how each approached solving the United States‟ problem with the North 
African corsairs and their rulers.  Eaton‟s Orientalist approach to describing both piracy and the 
people led him to want to fight the “brutes” to the bitter end, risking his life, the lives of his men, 
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and eventually ruining his political career.  Jefferson‟s practical approach to seeing piracy as not 
the product of a depraved society but rather as a conventional crime that must be removed to 
save the society allowed him the flexibility to do whatever necessary to defeat the pirates, even if 
the situation called for him to compromise on nearly fifteen years of advocating military force in 
favor of a developing peace treaty with Tripoli.   
The writings of Jefferson and Eaton examined for this essay share one major 
commonality: they emphasize the restoration of “honor” instead of “liberty” like in the popular 
discourse.  By emphasizing honor instead of liberty, both men skirt the issue of slavery that is 
present in some of the popular works.  Some could say that these men missed an opportunity to 
engage in the public dialogue on such a controversial issue, but for Jefferson and Eaton, 
America‟s war in North Africa was not about slavery, but about the eradication of the threat of 
piracy to the United States.  The continued practice of “piracy” and privateering in North Africa 
posed a major threat to not only American and European vessels trading in the Mediterranean 
Sea but also to those living in North Africa who were subjected to the corruption and greed of 
their rulers and of the corsair population.  For Jefferson and Eaton, America‟s war in North 
Africa was a war to restore honor to the United States and Europe by ending the practice of 
humiliating tributary payments and, for Jefferson, to restore the honor of a repressed population 
burdened by the “degrading yoke” of piracy.      
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